I am currently working on two journal articles.
The first, which is the more substantial of the two, uses alliance theories and historical documents to contextualise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and assess its potential to become a multilateral alliance. First, I consider alliance theories of chain-gangs and buck-passing, in conjunction with ideas of the offence-defence balance, to consider how geography affects alliance cohesion. In the paper’s second section, I examine Washington’s significant and persistent efforts to form a multilateral alliance in Asia during the Cold War. Though Victor Cha has argued that the U.S. purposefully "chose" a bilateral alliance structure, I argue that the U.S. desired, and worked towards, a multilateral alliance even into the 1960s. Such an alliance was not feasible because, in the words of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, there was not a sufficiently tight-knit "community of interest," nor a "common sense of destiny," among the proposed member-states. Finally, in the paper’s last section I use these insights to critique the contemporary concept of the Quad.
The second article investigates the applicability of the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) to a future crisis across the Taiwan Strait. Though many claim that the ANZUS alliance would inevitably oblige and commit Australia to fight alongside the U.S. in any defence of Taiwan, I argue—for several reasons—that this interpretation is incorrect. In this paper, I use archival material from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to explore the formation of the alliance, and how its commitments were understood by the senior officials involved in the negotiations.
The first, which is the more substantial of the two, uses alliance theories and historical documents to contextualise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and assess its potential to become a multilateral alliance. First, I consider alliance theories of chain-gangs and buck-passing, in conjunction with ideas of the offence-defence balance, to consider how geography affects alliance cohesion. In the paper’s second section, I examine Washington’s significant and persistent efforts to form a multilateral alliance in Asia during the Cold War. Though Victor Cha has argued that the U.S. purposefully "chose" a bilateral alliance structure, I argue that the U.S. desired, and worked towards, a multilateral alliance even into the 1960s. Such an alliance was not feasible because, in the words of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, there was not a sufficiently tight-knit "community of interest," nor a "common sense of destiny," among the proposed member-states. Finally, in the paper’s last section I use these insights to critique the contemporary concept of the Quad.
The second article investigates the applicability of the Australia-New Zealand-United States Security Treaty (ANZUS) to a future crisis across the Taiwan Strait. Though many claim that the ANZUS alliance would inevitably oblige and commit Australia to fight alongside the U.S. in any defence of Taiwan, I argue—for several reasons—that this interpretation is incorrect. In this paper, I use archival material from Australia, New Zealand, and the United States to explore the formation of the alliance, and how its commitments were understood by the senior officials involved in the negotiations.
